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This paper analyzes the impact of international trade on the quality of institu-
tions, such as contract enforcement, property rights, or investor protection. It presents
a model in which institutional dierences play two roles: they create rents for some
parties within the economy, and they are a source of comparative advantage in trade.
Institutional quality is determined in a Grossman-Helpman type lobbying game. When
countries share the same technology, there is a \race to the top" in institutional qual-
ity: irrespective of country characteristics, both trade partners are forced to improve
institutions after opening. On the other hand, domestic institutions will not improve in
either trading partner when one of the countries has a strong enough technological com-
parative advantage in the good that relies on institutions. We test these predictions in a
sample of 141 countries, by extending the geography-based methodology of Frankel and
Romer (1999). Countries whose exogenous geographical characteristics predispose them
to exporting in institutionally intensive sectors enjoy signicantly higher institutional
quality.
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11 Introduction
Recent literature on the economics of institutions has established a set of important re-
sults. First, institutions matter a great deal for economic performance (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, e.g. 1997, 1998, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, e.g.
2001, 2005a, Rodrik, e.g. 2007). Second, in spite of the obvious overall benets to institu-
tional improvement, institutions are in fact very persistent (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
Relatedly, episodes of institutional change are rare, and they are typically associated with
large and abrupt changes in the economic environment. Finally, institutions are a source of
comparative advantage in trade, and the welfare consequences of institutional comparative
advantage are often ambiguous (Levchenko, 2007, Nunn, 2007, Costinot, 2006).
This paper analyzes the eect of international trade on economic institutions. It builds
a model in which institutions play two key roles. First, they generate rents for some parties
within the economy. Second, they are a source of comparative advantage in trade. Then,
it endogenizes institutional quality using a simple version of the lobbying framework of
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995). When countries share the same technology, trade
leads to a \race to the top" in institutional quality. Trading partners improve institutions
up to the best attainable level after opening, as they compete to capture the sectors that
generate rents. By contrast, when one of the trading partners has a suciently strong
technological comparative advantage in the rent-bearing good, institutions do not improve
after trade opening in either country. When other sources of comparative advantage are
strong enough, changing institutions will not aect trade patterns, and thus trade does
not create an incentive to improve them. The paper then tests these predictions in a
sample of 141 countries, and demonstrates that countries whose geographic characteristics
predispose them to develop comparative advantage in the institutionally intensive sectors
exhibit signicantly higher institutional quality.
Why study the eects of trade on institutions? Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005a) emphasize the idea that institutions are inherently persistent. The reason for this
persistence is that agents in command of political power install the kinds of economic insti-
tutions that redistribute resources in the economy to themselves. In turn, the distribution
of resources that favors those agents also endows them with political power. The two-way
dependence between the distribution of resources in the economy and political power proves
dicult to break. This kind of framework suggests that one way institutional change could
occur is through large and discrete changes in either the distribution of resources, or the
distribution of power in the economy. Trade opening is a natural place to look for a source
2of such changes, as it aects the structure of the economy in fundamental, and often abrupt,
ways. Indeed, it is widely hoped that greater openness will improve institutional quality
through a variety of channels, including reducing rents, creating constituencies for reform,
and inducing specialization in sectors that demand good institutions (IMF, 2005; Johnson,
Ostry, and Subramanian, 2007). Rodrik (2000) argues that the greatest growth benets of
trade liberalization may well come not from the conventional channels, but from the institu-
tional reform that trade liberalization can engender. However, no well-accepted theoretical
framework or a set of basic results on this question currently exist. This paper is an attempt
to ll this gap.
To analyze the eect of trade on institutional quality, we must rst build a model of
institutions. To do so, this paper uses the insights from the incomplete contracts literature
exemplied by Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986). The quality of contract
enforcement and property rights are important because they allow agents to overcome the
well-known holdup problem. This modeling approach is advantageous because it leads to
a concrete interpretation of what constitutes institutional quality, suggested by Caballero
and Hammour (1998): in countries with worse institutions contracts are more incomplete.
This framework can be adapted seamlessly and tractably to both trade openness and the
political economy of institutions.
An important aspect of the incomplete contracts setup is that some parties to production
earn rents. If endowed with political power, those parties will install imperfect institutions
in order to capture those rents. This feature lends itself naturally to endogenizing insti-
tutions. In order to do so, we adopt a political economy model following Grossman and
Helpman (1994).1 As shown by Caballero and Hammour (1998), the parties earning rents
benet from making institutions worse, up to a certain point. This paper uses Caballero
and Hammour's insight in a fully specied lobbying model in order to derive equilibrium
institutional outcomes. We show that in autarky, institutions can be sub-optimal, precisely
for this reason. Thus, one of the contributions of this paper is to introduce a parsimo-
nious and tractable model of endogenous institutions, which combines the insights from the
literatures on both incomplete contracts and political economy.
When it comes to international trade, it is immediate that institutional dierences are
also a source of comparative advantage: when countries open to trade, only the country
with better institutions produces the institutionally intensive good, which is characterized
1An innovative aspect of this paper is that while the large majority of papers employing the Grossman-
Helpman framework apply it to scal instruments { be it taris, taxes, or subsidies { we use it to model the
determination of institutions instead.
3by rents. Thus, the rents disappear as a result of trade opening in the country with inferior
institutions.2 Under trade, we assume that both countries set institutions non-cooperatively
as in the two-country model of Grossman and Helpman (1995). When countries share the
same technology, the resulting equilibrium is a \race to the top" in institutional quality:
both countries improve institutions up to the best attainable level. This is because rents
{ the very reason to lobby for bad institutions { disappear, unless institutions improve to
at least the level slightly better than the trading partner's. When both countries set their
institutional quality simultaneously and non-cooperatively, equilibrium is characterized by
the best attainable institutions, a Bertrand-like outcome.3
What is remarkable about this result is that it does not depend on country characteris-
tics. The country may have such features that its equilibrium institutions are very bad in
autarky. However, under trade those features no longer matter. Note also that the \race to
the top" result is completely due to the changing preferences of the lobby groups regarding
the optimality of institutions. That is, the political power of lobby groups does not change
as a result of trade opening. Nonetheless, institutions improve.4
Though quite basic, this framework also reveals the circumstances under which this logic
would fail. Note that the driving force behind institutional improvement in this model is
that rents disappear as a result of trade opening in the country with inferior institutions.
If instead the rents do not disappear, trade no longer creates the incentive to improve insti-
tutions. One way this could occur is due to dierences in technology. If one of the trading
partners has a suciently strong comparative advantage in the institutionally intensive
good, changing institutions in either country will not aect the specialization patterns.
Thus, if technologies in the two countries are suciently dierent, the race to the top will
not occur. In fact, in this case trade opening may actually increase rents rather than de-
crease them, and institutions will deteriorate as a result of trade opening in the country
2See Levchenko (2007) for a detailed analysis of this result.
3Note that we do not attempt to endogenize trade opening. Endogenous trade policy has been the
subject of a large literature, and remains beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g. Rodrik, 1995, and
Grossman and Helpman, 2002). Nonetheless, we believe that our exercise is still well worth pursuing. First,
in many instances changes in trade openness have indeed been exogenous, driven by technological shocks
or changes in colonial regimes. Second, many other factors besides ensuing institutional change contribute
to the formation of trade policy. Thus, it could be that even when trade openness is endogenous, it is
driven by factors unrelated to those we are modeling. The policy initiatives promoting unconditional trade
liberalization in developing countries are an important example. Finally, in order to analyze trade opening
and endogenous institutions simultaneously, it is important to rst understand how the former aects the
latter. This paper studies that question, and thus can be used as a building block for a more complete
analysis. Indeed, our approach can be viewed as complementary to the trade policy literature, which
endogenizes openness but assumes that institutions are exogenous and do not change with trade opening.
4Thus, in order to observe institutional improvement, trade need not necessarily empower the \right"
groups, as in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005b).
4that exports the institutionally intensive good.
Having developed the main intuition regarding the eect of trade opening on institutions,
the paper takes it to the data. The key prediction is that countries improve institutions
as a result of trade opening if doing so allows them to retain or attract the institutionally
dependent sectors. When it comes to actual country experiences, however, it is clear that
some countries do not have much hope of attracting those sectors. This would be the case
if they have a suciently strong comparative disadvantage in the institutionally intensive
goods, so that even if they improve institutions, they would not be able to attract those
sectors. In this case, the incentive to improve institutions is lost, and trade does not have
a positive eect.
These predictions imply that in order to empirically test for the eect of trade on in-
stitutions, we must rst establish which countries would be the most able to attract the
institutionally dependent sectors under trade. We would then expect to see a positive im-
pact of trade on institutions especially in those countries. In order to develop a measure of
predicted comparative (dis)advantage in institutionally intensive sectors, the paper follows
a strategy similar to Do and Levchenko (2007a). The key idea is to use exogenous geo-
graphic variables to predict each country's export pattern, by expanding the methodology
of Frankel and Romer (1999). These authors use the gravity model to predict bilateral
trade volumes between each pair of countries based on a set of geographical variables, such
as bilateral distance, common border, area, and population. Summing up across trading
partners then yields, for each country, its \natural openness:" the overall trade to GDP as
predicted by its geography. In order to get a measure of predicted trade patterns rather
than total trade volumes, Do and Levchenko's (2007a) point of departure is to estimate the
Frankel and Romer gravity regressions for each industry. This makes it possible to obtain
the predicted trade volume not just in each country, but also in each sector within each
country. Combining these with an index of \institutional intensity" at industry level from
Nunn (2007) yields a measure of predicted institutional intensity of exports. In essence,
this approach uses exogenous geographical variables, together with information on how
those geographical variables aect industries dierentially, to construct a measure of how
institutionally intensive a country's export pattern is expected to be.
A country's predicted institutional intensity of exports is indeed a robust determinant
of institutions in a cross-section of 141 countries. Countries that, due to their geography,
have the potential to export in institutionally intensive sectors have better institutions, all
else equal. This result is robust to the inclusion of a variety controls, use of alternative
5predicted institutional intensity of exports measures, and subsamples.
This paper is part of a growing literature on the impact of trade openness on domes-
tic institutions. Using dierent theoretical frameworks, Segura-Cayuela (2006), Stefanadis
(2006), and Dal B o and Dal B o (2004) demonstrate that economic institutions and policies
can deteriorate as a result of trade opening in countries with weak political institutions.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005a) argue that in some West European countries,
Atlantic trade during the period 1500-1850 engendered good institutions by creating a mer-
chant class, that became a powerful lobby for institutional improvement. Do and Levchenko
(2007b) develop a model in which trade opening creates incentives to improve institutions,
but may also lead to strengthening of elites. This paper is the rst to model the eect
of trade on institutions using a framework in which institutions matter for trade patterns
themselves. Doing so allows us to study this question in a model that features two-way in-
teractions between institutions and trade, and therefore use the insights from the literature
on institutional comparative advantage. In addition, this framework has the advantage of
tractability while at the same time generating a rich set of comparative statics.
Empirical studies by Ades and di Tella (1997), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004),
and Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) nd that overall trade openness has a positive eect on
institutional quality in a cross-section of countries, though this result is not always robust.
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) demonstrate that institutional quality rises following trade
liberalization episodes. This paper focuses on predicted institutional intensity of trade
patterns, and shows that it matters more than the overall trade openness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the production and
trade side of the model, deriving the autarky and trade equilibria at each exogenously given
level of institutional quality of the trading partners. Section 3 endogenizes institutions in
a political economy framework of lobbying, and presents the main analytical results in the
paper. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and results. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
of Propositions are collected in the Appendix.
2 A Model of Institutions, Production, and Trade
2.1 The Environment
The model of production and trade is based on Levchenko (2007). Consider an economy
with two factors, capital (K) and entrepreneurs (H), and three goods. Two of the goods
are produced using only one factor, and thus we call them the K-good and the H-good.
The mixed good, M, is produced with both factors.
6Production technology of the K-good and the H-good is linear in K and H. Suppose
that one unit of capital produces a units of the K-good, and one unit of H produces b units
of the H-good. Then prot maximization in the two industries implies that
pKa = r and pHb = w; (1)
where r and w are the returns to capital and entrepreneurs respectively.
The M-good is produced with a Leontief technology that combines one unit of H and
x units of K to produce y units of the M-good. This paper takes the view that institutions
matter because they facilitate transactions between distinct self-interested economic parties.
The M-good is the only one that requires joining of two distinct factors of production, and
thus it is natural to think of the M-good as being dependent on institutions. We now
describe how we use the incomplete contracts framework to model imperfect institutions,
and how this approach creates a source of comparative advantage: institutional dierences.
To model a setting in which the quality of contract enforcement and property rights mat-
ter, we adopt the approach developed by Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986),
and Hart and Moore (1990). The strategy is to posit a friction that can be alleviated by ap-
propriately designed contracts and property rights. Following Klein, Crawford and Alchian
(1978) and Williamson (1985), we assume that when two distinct parties invest in joint pro-
duction, some fraction of their investment becomes specic to the production relationship.
Investment irreversibility makes the parties more reluctant to enter, introducing ineciency
{ the well-known holdup problem. This argument has been used to analyze many kinds
of relationships: between producers within a supply chain, between managers and outside
investors, between rms and workers, and others. One way to reduce the ineciency is
to write binding long-term contracts. Another is to assign property rights in a way that
distributes the residual rights of control to moderate the holdup problem { this is the key
idea of Grossman-Hart-Moore. Institutions { quality of contract enforcement, security of
property rights, and the like { will matter a great deal for both of these solutions.
Our modeling approach follows Caballero and Hammour (1998). We focus on the case
in which the parties to production are K and H. For concreteness, H can be thought of
as managers or inside capital, while K would be the outside, or unorganized capital. This
interpretation would be in line with the La Porta et al.'s (1998) emphasis of the role of
institutions in the market for external nance. However, it is important to emphasize that
these arguments are more general and apply to many kinds of production relationships.
Relationship-specic investments occur in production of the M-good. In particular, a
fraction  of K's investment in the M-good sector becomes specic to the relationship. The
7parameter  is meant to capture quality of contract enforcement and property rights, and
its value will dier across countries. Better institutions thus correspond to lower values of
. In other words, if contracts and property rights are well-enforced, each agent will be able
to recoup its ex ante investment to a greater degree. This way of formalizing institutional
dierences is appealing because it leads to a concrete interpretation of what constitutes
institutional quality: countries with better institutions are the ones in which contracts are
less incomplete. In the limiting case when  = 0, institutions are perfect and we are back
to the standard frictionless setting.
What are the consequences of imperfect institutions? Recall that one unit of H and x
units of K are required to produce y units of M. After the production unit is formed, K
can only recover a fraction (1   ) of the investment. In order to induce K to form the
production unit, it must be compensated with a share of the surplus, which is given by the
revenue minus the ex post opportunity costs of the factors:
s = pMy   w   r(1   )x:
We adopt the assumption that ex post the parties reach a Nash bargaining solution and
each receive one half of the surplus. Thus, K will only enter the M-good production if its
individual rationality constraint




is satised. This can be rearranged to yield:
pMy  w + (1 + )rx: (2)
To complete the description of the setup, it remains to specify the demand for the three
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This approach to modeling institutions is easily embedded in the general equilibrium model
of this section, in which prices and resource allocations are endogenously determined. Notice
8that in general equilibrium, condition (2) can be interpreted as a joint restriction on w, r,
and pM, and will hold with equality.
The only remaining ingredient of the closed-economy equilibrium is market clearing. It
is useful to dene the following notation. Let E be the share of entrepreneurs (H) employed
in the M-sector. This is convenient because the value of E completely characterizes the
resource allocation in the economy. Given E and the relevant endowments K and H,












H; CH = b(1   E)H; and CM = yEH: (4)
The equilibrium in an economy endowed with K units of capital and H entrepreneurs is
a set of prices and the resource allocation fpK;pH;pM;r;w;Eg characterized by equations
(1) through (4).
Institutional imperfections modeled here have two key consequences. First, in general
equilibrium one of the factors { H in our case { is segmented: its rewards dier across





[pMy   w   (1   )rx] = w + rx: (5)
It is clear from this expression that each unit of H employed in the M-sector earns rents of
size rx.
Second, contracting imperfections imply that the outcome is inecient. There is un-
derinvestment in the M-good production, and w and r are lower than in the ecient case.
This result is intuitive. Imperfect institutions imply that it is harder to induce capital to
enter the M-sector. Compared to the frictionless case, w and r must be pushed down, and
pM pushed up to satisfy the individual rationality condition for capital (2). This is achieved
by reducing the size of the M-sector, which simultaneously pushes the factors into the K-
and the H-sectors, lowering w and r and raising pM. The eect is monotonic in : higher
values of  lead to lower E, w, and r. Notice also that for a given level of ; increasing the
size of the M-sector will raise both w and r, thereby raising welfare of all factors employed
in all sectors.
2.3 Trade Equilibrium and Institutional Comparative Advantage
The model is easily adapted to an international trade setting in the presence of both factor
endowment and institutional dierences. Suppose that there are two countries, A and B,
9that can trade costlessly with each other. Following the standard notation, let V = (K;H)




be a partition of world factor endowments into the two countries, so that K = KA + KB
and H = HA + HB.
In order to endogenize institutions in the next section, we must rst understand what
happens in this model at any given level of institutional dierences. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that country A has better institutions: A < B. In A a lower fraction of
K becomes specic to the M-sector production unit, or, equivalently, contracts are less
incomplete there. The description of the trade equilibrium proceeds in two steps. In the
rst step, we assume that technology is the same in the two countries, and show how
institutional dierences act as a source of comparative advantage. In the second step, we
introduce technological dierences, and describe how they can aect trade patterns.
Suppose rst that technology is the same in the two countries, but institutions dier.
How can we determine the pattern of production and trade? Dierences in institutional
quality act in a way similar to a Ricardian productivity dierence in the M-sector to generate
comparative advantage and trade. It turns out that the trade equilibrium can be analyzed
using an approach akin to the Davis (1995) Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo model. The starting
point of the analysis is the integrated equilibrium, which is the resource allocation that
results under perfect factor mobility. It is obtained by solving for the equilibrium of a closed




the integrated equilibrium factor allocations in industry i = K;H;M.
The key insight of the Davis model is that if one country can produce one of the goods
more cheaply than the other at a common set of factor prices, in the integrated equilibrium
only that country's production process will be used to produce that particular good. In
the Davis model, the dierence between countries is in Ricardian productivity. Here, it
arises instead because country A's less incomplete contracts allow it to sell the M-good at
a strictly lower price. This is immediate from equation (2): the price at which the M-good
can be produced under country A's institutions is strictly less than the price when country
B's institutions are used:
pMy = w + (1 + A)rx < w + (1 + B)rx; (6)
as A < B. Therefore, in the integrated equilibrium, only A's institutions will be used to
produce the M-good.
From the integrated equilibrium production pattern we can construct a set of partitions
10of world factor endowments into countries called the Factor Price Equalization (FPE) set.
Following Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Davis (1995), dene the FPE set as follows:
Denition 1 Let ic denote the share of the integrated equilibrium production of good i
that comes from country c. Then, the Factor Price Equalization (FPE) set is a set of




j 9K;A;H;A;K;B;H;B  0;such that




V (i) for c = A;Bg:
This denition states that the two countries' factor endowments belong to the FPE set
when i) country A has enough of both factors to produce the entire integrated equilibrium
world quantity of the M-good; and ii) the integrated equilibrium production of the K- and
H-goods can be allocated between the two countries while keeping all factors fully employed.
The FPE set is important because when country endowments belong to it, the integrated
equilibrium world resource allocations and prices are replicated purely through trade, as
stated formally in the proposition below.5
Proposition 1 When A < B, and
 
V A;V B
2 FPE, the trade equilibrium world re-
source allocation, factor prices, and goods prices replicate those of the integrated equilibrium.
Therefore, in the trade equilibrium, only country A produces the M-good.
This result implies that in order to analyze the trade outcomes, we need to do little
more than solve for the integrated equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the analysis. The sides
of the box represent the world factor endowments. Any point in the diagram can represent
a division of the world factor endowments into countries, where country A's endowments
are measured from OA, and country B's from OB. The shaded area represents the FPE set.
Since in the integrated equilibrium only A's institutional setting will be used in production
of the M-good, country endowments can only belong to the FPE set if the entire integrated
equilibrium production of the M-good can be accommodated in A. This is the case, for
example, at point P.
5We must use the term FPE with caution here. Factor rewards are equalized across countries in each
sector, but in this model they dier across sectors. Thus, relative factor rewards across countries will be
determined by which sectors operate in which countries. Nevertheless, the FPE set still has the useful feature
that for appropriate factor endowments it allows us to analyze the trade outcomes by rst constructing the
integrated equilibrium.
11Let V c(i) = [Hc(i);Kc(i)] be the trade equilibrium use of factors in industry i and
country c. The pattern of production is graphically illustrated in Figure 2 for the factor
endowments at point R. While in autarky the M-good was produced in both countries,
under trade country B stops producing M altogether, and now its entire factor endowment
is dedicated to production of the K-good and the H-good. In country A the M-sector
increases to accommodate the entire world demand.
For the purposes of endogenizing institutions, the most important result is that the
M-sector disappears following trade opening in the country with inferior institutions. That
implies that the rents H was earning in the M-sector disappear upon trade opening. Returns
to H in country B in autarky can be expressed as:
wBHB + BrBxEBHB;
while under trade they are:
wTHB:
Note that this does not have unambiguous implications for aggregate welfare, or even overall
returns to H in country B: though H formerly employed in the M-sector loses rents, the
base return to H, wT, goes up as a result of trade: wT > wB. The same can be said of the
return to K: rT > rB. What matters for the purposes of this paper is that the behavior of
rents in autarky and under trade has an important impact on the lobbying game.
The key to the political economy analysis in the following section is that when countries
open to trade and institutional dierences are the source of comparative advantage, the
country with inferior institutions loses the M-sector, and therefore the rents associated
with it. In order to anticipate some of the results that follow, it is important to also discuss
the eect of technology dierences on trade patterns in this model. Suppose that in the
M-sector, countries also have dierent productivities, yA and yB. How will these dierences
aect the conclusions above?
It turns out that the logic of the analysis is largely unchanged. In order to construct
the integrated equilibrium, all we need to examine is which country can deliver the M-good
more cheaply at common factor prices. Facing the same factor prices w and r, country A can
produce the M-good at a price of pM =
w+(1+A)rx
yA (see also equation 6). Country B can
deliver the M-good at the price equal to
w+(1+B)rx
yB . Thus, in the integrated equilibrium,
only the country in which this value is lowest will produce the M-good.
There are two possibilities to consider. First, suppose that country A { which already has
better institutions { is also more productive in the M-good: yA > yB. Then, the analysis is
12exactly the same as above: there is simply an extra reason why A ends up with the M-sector
under trade. The M-sector still expands in A, and disappears in B, along with the rents.
By contrast, suppose that country B is better: yA < yB. Then, institutional comparative





yB . It could be that A's institutional comparative advantage
is still strong enough that it is better at producing M under a common set of factor prices.
In that case, the analysis is still unchanged. However, if B has a much better technology, it
may end up producing the M-good under trade in spite of its inferior institutions. In that
case, the FPE set is the set of all endowments such that the entire integrated equilibrium
quantity of the M-good can be produced in B, and institutional dierences are not the
salient source of trade. The outcome can be analyzed as a special case of the Davis (1995)
model.
To summarize, in the presence of Ricardian technology dierences, institutional quality
may not aect trade patterns. Countries with better institutions will not necessarily special-
ize in institutionally intensive goods under trade, if they have suciently inferior technology
for producing it compared to its trading partner. As the next section demonstrates, this
can aect countries' incentives to improve institutions after trade opening.
3 Political Economy of Institutions
This section asks the central question of this paper: how does opening to trade aect
institutional quality? We adopt a simple political economy model of institutional choice, and
analyze outcomes before and after trade. To do this, we combine the model of production
and trade developed in the previous section with the political economy of special interest
groups framework of Grossman and Helpman (1995, 2001, ch. 7-8). We rst consider
equilibrium institutions in autarky, and then describe how these change when two trading
countries set domestic institutions taking into account those of the trade partner.
3.1 Institutions in Autarky
Suppose there is one policymaker and one interest group representing H { the factor that
earns rents when institutions are imperfect.6 The policymaker receives a nonnegative con-
6This could be because the ownership of H is more concentrated than the ownership of K, and thus H is
the only factor that is able to solve the collective action problem associated with forming a lobby group. If
all agents in the economy lobbied the policymaker, it is well known that the equilibrium policy maximizes
aggregate welfare. In this model, that corresponds to always setting up perfect institutions. Notice that
for this reason, some asymmetry in lobby participation is typically assumed. In our case, it is actually
not important whether H or K can lobby. As will become clear below, if K were the lobby instead of H,
13tribution of size  from the interest group, and sets institutional quality  to maximize its
political objective function G(;). We adopt the standard assumption that the policy-
maker maximizes a weighted sum of the aggregate welfare in the economy, S(), and the
political contribution :
G(;) = S() + (1   );
where  2 [0;1]. In this formulation,  can be thought of as parameterizing corruption, and
shows the extent to which the policymaker is captive to the interest group. At one extreme,
when  = 1, the policymaker is the benevolent social planner. At the other, when  = 0, it
cares only about its political contributions, and in eect sets the policy to serve exclusively
the special interest.
The interest group in
uences the policymaker by making its contribution contingent on
the government's choice of . In particular, the interest group confronts the government
with a schedule,  = (), which species the contribution the policymaker will receive for
each level of  that it might set. The objective function of the interest group is simply H's
total welfare, SH(), net of the contribution:
V (;) = SH()   :
The timing of the game can be thought of as follows: rst, the interest group makes its
contribution schedule known to the policymaker. Then the policymaker sets institutional
quality . Given this , agents make their production and consumption decisions. This last
stage is simply the equilibrium outcome of the model in the preceding section. Thus, under
the assumptions put on preferences, aggregate welfare equals aggregate real income:
S() = r()K + [w() + xr()E()]H:
S() is maximized when institutions are perfect ( = 0), and decreases as institutions
deteriorate (dS
d < 0). This is intuitive because imperfect institutions introduce a distortion
in an otherwise frictionless setting. As discussed in the previous section, the reward to
capital, r(), decreases unambiguously in , as does w().
Imperfect institutions can arise because the agents extracting rents can lobby the pol-
icymaker. The interest group's objective function is entrepreneurs' real income net of the
contribution:
V (;) = [w() + xr()E()]H   :
the problem would be symmetric: K would lobby the policymaker to set up institutions such that some of
H becomes relationship-specic. In this sense, the assumption in the previous section that some fraction
 of K's investment becomes specic to the relationship is not the primitive assumption. The primitive
assumption is that H can organize into a lobby, while K cannot.
14This function makes it apparent why H will lobby for positive : imperfect institutions
allow H to earn rents equal to xr()E()H. The interest group bribes the policymaker to
increase  above the socially optimal value of zero.7 The contribution must be large enough
to compensate the government for the disutility it suers from the resulting decrease in
aggregate welfare. We now provide the basic denitions and state the main result.
Denition 2 The policymaker's best-response set to a contribution function () con-
sists of all feasible policies  that maximize G(;).
Denition 3 A policy  and a contribution schedule () constitute an equilibrium in
the lobbying game with a single policymaker and a single interest group if i)  belongs to the
policymaker's best-response set to (); and ii) there exists no other feasible contribution
function 0() and policy 0 such that 0 is in the policymaker's best response set to 0()
and V (0;0()) > V (;()).
Proposition 2 The autarky equilibrium institutional quality  is given by:
 = arg max
2[0;1]
f[w() + xr()E()]H + r()Kg: (7)
There exist values of  2 [0;1) for which the autarky equilibrium institutions are imperfect:
 > 0.
This Proposition states that the equilibrium value of institutional quality maximizes a
weighted sum of all agents' welfare levels, with higher weight given to those belonging to the
interest group. Furthermore, for any set of parameters that characterize the production side
of the model, if the power of the interest group is suciently high, equilibrium institutions
will be imperfect. This results captures the notion that in autarky institutions are a function
of the country's characteristics, and bad institutions may arise as an equilibrium outcome.
7Strictly speaking, of course, only entrepreneurs in the M-sector earn rents, thus in some sense it would
be more natural to take only this subset of H to be the interest group. The problem with this choice is
that the fraction of entrepreneurs employed in the M-sector is itself a function of institutions in our model,
so the boundaries of the interest group change with the policy choice. To avoid this problem, we assume
that the interest group represents the entire population of entrepreneurs, and choose to ignore disagreements
between its dierent subsets.
An alternative would be to assume that the interest group represents only \inside entrepreneurs" H
I,
which is the part of H that is employed in the M-sector no matter what the value of . In that case, we
must put a restriction ensuring that H
I < EminH, where Emin is the smallest possible equilibrium size of
the M-sector. The analysis under this alternative modeling assumption is qualitatively the same as the one
presented in this section. Note that the inside entrepreneurs always prefer higher  than an interest group
which maximizes the welfare of overall H. This is because higher  unambiguously hurts the entrepreneurs
in the H-sector, which the inside entrepreneurs do not care about.
153.2 Institutions under Trade
We can now contrast these conclusions with the outcome under trade. Suppose that, just
as in autarky, each country has one interest group representing H, and the policymaker's
objective function is unchanged. The timing of events is similar to the autarky case. First,
the countries play the contribution game simultaneously and noncooperatively. Then, pro-
duction and trade take place. Under trade, the interest group in each country must take
into account institutional quality of the trading partner. We now state the denitions for
the trade game.
Denition 4 Let  c be an arbitrary institutional quality value of country c's trading part-
ner. Then a feasible contribution schedule (; c) and an institutional quality c are an
equilibrium response to  c if i) c is the policymaker's best response to the contribution
schedule (; c); and ii) there does not exist a feasible contribution schedule 0(; c)
and a level of institutions c0 such that a) c0 is in the policymaker's best response set to
0(; c) and b) V (c0;0(; c)) > V (c;0(; c)).
Denition 5 A noncooperative equilibrium consists of political contribution functions
(; c) for c = A;B and a pair of institutional quality values A and B, such that

(;B);A
is an equilibrium response to B and

(;A);B
is an equilibrium re-
sponse to A.
The following Proposition describes the features of equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium institutions in the two countries under trade, A and B,
solve two equations in two unknowns given by
c( c) = arg max
c2[0;1]

w(c; c)Hc + cxr(c; c)Ec(c; c)H + cr(c; c)Kc	
; (8)
c = A;B. In equilibrium, when the technology for producing the M-good does not dier
between countries, at least one country is characterized by perfect institutions, c = 0, and
thus the world as a whole reaches the rst best allocation.
This Proposition states that institutions under trade are obtained by simultaneously
solving the equilibrium response functions of the two countries. In the equilibrium without
Ricardian productivity dierences between countries, one of following is the outcome: i)
institutions are perfect in both countries, A = B = 0; or, ii) institutions are perfect in
one of the countries, c = 0, while the other country is indierent between all of the possible
16qualities of domestic institutions. In both cases, the world as a whole reaches the rst best
allocation, as the M-good is produced only using perfect institutions.
Figure 3 illustrates this Proposition. It gives the equilibrium best responses for the two
countries as a function of the trading partner's institutions. Up to a certain level of , the
best response is to set domestic  at a level just below the trading partner's. This allows
the country to retain the M-sector, and earn rents. Beyond a certain level of , it is no
longer optimal to raise it further, and thus as long as a country's institutions are better
than the trading partner's, they do not depend on its . This diagram is reminiscent of
the best response functions associated with the Bertrand oligopoly model. Just as in the
Bertrand oligopoly, the equilibrium is to set both 's to zero.
Recalling the analysis of the trade equilibrium, it is easy to see why the outcome is
perfect institutional quality. The M-sector can only be located in the institutionally superior
country, and only that country's institutions matter in determining the factor prices. If
ever c   c  0 with at least one strict inequality, all parties in country c strictly prefer
to improve domestic institutions to a level just below  c. Not only do w(c; c) and
r(c; c) increase as a result, but country c also captures the worldwide rents associated
with locating the M-sector at home.
The mechanisms that made it possible to observe imperfect equilibrium institutions in
autarky no longer work in the presence of a trade partner. Notice that the only reason
H lobbies to increase  above the socially optimal level of zero is because it can earn
rents in the M-sector. But under trade, H will only capture those rents so long as it is
the institutionally superior country. In the institutionally inferior country, H will actually
have an incentive to lobby for institutional improvement, up to a point at which it has at
least slightly better institutions than its trade partner. In eect, competition to capture
the rent-bearing M-sector results in a \race to the top" in institutional quality between
countries.
What is remarkable about this Proposition is that under trade, the rst best institutional
quality outcome occurs irrespective of any country characteristics. Both countries can be
entirely corrupt (c = 0), so that the policymakers are completely captive to the special
interest group. In autarky, these countries can have very bad institutions. Nevertheless,
trade will force institutional improvement even in the most corrupt country.
173.3 Technological Dierences
This paper establishes the result that when trade reduces rents, it also changes the nature of
the political economy game that gives rise to those rents. In the symmetric case, this leads
to institutional improvement in both countries. What are the crucial assumptions behind
this result? Economically, the most important assumption is that trade opening reduces
rents in the institutionally inferior country. We can use the framework in this paper to
also think about what happens when trade increases rents instead. The simplest way to
model such a case is to introduce productivity dierences between countries. For instance,
suppose that country A is more productive in the M-sector: yA > yB. Furthermore,
suppose for simplicity that the technological advantage is substantial, in the sense that
even if country B's institutions were the best possible, B = 0, country A would still have a
cost advantage at producing the M-good at the common world factor prices and its autarky
level of institutional quality:






How do institutions change in response to trade opening in the two countries? Note that
the logic behind the analysis of the trade patterns remains unchanged here. As discussed
at the end of the previous section, as long as country A can produce the entire integrated
equilibrium world quantity of good M, it is the only country which will produce it under
trade. This is because its Ricardian comparative advantage in good M is strong enough to
overcome its inferior institutions.
What happens to the institutional lobbying game in this case? Since the situation is
no longer symmetric, it is helpful to write out the equilibrium best responses for the two
countries:
A(B) = arg max
A2[0;1]

w(A)HA + Axr(A)EA(A)H + Ar(A)KA	
; (9)





For both countries, the equilibrium best response expression no longer depends on B,
since A will produce in the rent-bearing M-sector no matter what country B does with
its institutions. Therefore, the \race to the top" result disappears. Country A no longer
has an incentive to improve institutions, because it will not lose the rents to country B.
Furthermore, it is easy to demonstrate that institutions actually deteriorate in country A
after trade opening under these circumstances. Comparing the expressions that dene the
18autarky and trade institutions in country A, (7) and (9), we can see that the only dierence
between them is the rents term, which increases from Axr(A)EA(A)HA in autarky to
Axr(A)EA(A)H under trade. Thus, the level of A that maximizes (9) is greater under
trade than in autarky. Figure 4 illustrates this outcome. Here, country B's equilibrium
best response is irrelevant, while country A's equilibrium best response is dened by a
value A
trade. Institutions deteriorate in country A: A
trade > A
aut.
3.4 Limits to Institutional Improvement
The model can be modied to capture the notion that some countries cannot improve their
institutions as eciently as others. This could be due to inherent geographical or historical
dierences across countries, for instance. What happens when the best attainable level of
institutional quality { let us call it c { is dierent between countries? The logic of the
model remains unchanged, and the equilibrium is still given by equations (8), with only one




for both countries c = A;B. The
outcomes then depend on the magnitude of the dierence between A and B. Suppose,
without loss of generality, that A < B: country A can attain better institutions than
country B. For B low enough, the outcome is depicted in Figure 5. Intuitively, if one
could think of the symmetric equilibrium as a Bertrand outcome, this case is something
akin to limit pricing: country A will improve institutions to a level just better than B.
Having worse institutions than B implies that country A loses the M-sector. For low
enough B, having much better institutions than that does not maximize rents in A. As
depicted in the Figure, trade does result in institutional improvement in country A, but to
a lesser extent than in the baseline case, as A does not need to go all the way to the best
attainable level of institutional quality to retain the M-sector.
It is also clear that if B is high enough, there is no institutional improvement in country
A at all, in fact institutions in A may deteriorate as a result of trade opening. This is the
case when B > A
aut. Under autarky institutions in A, trade opening can never result in the
loss of the M-sector, and thus there is no impetus for institutional improvement. In fact,
the \limit pricing" logic implies that institutions will actually deteriorate, as under trade
country A can capture more rents, an intuition similar to that in the previous subsection.
4 Empirical Evidence
Existing empirical results on the impact of international trade on institutions estimate the
simple non-conditional relationship between institutional quality and measures of overall
19trade openness. The main theoretical result of the paper is that opening to trade will have
a tendency to improve institutions, suggesting that the overall trade openness should indeed
play a positive role. However, this eect is also highly conditional on country characteris-
tics, as we just demonstrated with two simple examples. In particular, countries that for
some reason cannot capture the institutionally intensive sectors simply by improving their
institutions have no incentive to do so. The empirical evidence presented in this section is
based on this intuition.
In particular, this paper builds a measure that combines the role of overall openness
with how likely the country is to export in institutionally intensive sectors, and analyzes
how it aects institutions. We thus estimate the following equation in the cross-section of
countries:
INSTc =  + IIXc + 
Zc + "c: (11)
The left-hand side variable, INSTc; is a measure of a country's quality of institutions, and
Zc is a vector of controls. The right-hand side variable of interest, IIXc, is a measure of
predicted institutional intensity of exports: how easy it is for the country to export in the
institutionally intensive sectors under trade. Or course, this variable is constructed without
regard for the country's actual institutional quality or actual trade patterns, as explained
below. The main hypothesis is that the eect of IIXc on institutions is positive ( > 0).8
Before carrying out the empirical analysis, it is worth making an additional remark.
In the model, the country that has a very strong technological comparative advantage in
the institutionally intensive sector may actually experience a deterioration of institutions
as a result of trade opening. In the world comprised of hundreds of countries, however,
it is unlikely that any single country will have such a strong comparative advantage in
institutionally intensive sectors that it will be able to export in those sectors even if it
had bad institutions. That is, in the presence of some 15 or 20 countries with a very high
insititutional quality (i.e. the OECD), it is unlikely that any individual country will have
such a high value of IIX that is would actually nd it optimal to reduce its quality of
institutions after trade opening. We conrmed this intuition by examining whether the
8Note that the results in this paper exploit variation in institutions in the cross-section of countries. This
choice is dictated primarily by lack of data availability: there are no reliable datasets on institutional quality
with suciently long time series to capture enough episodes on institutional change. (For instance, the
International Country Risk Guide has observations for several dozen countries going back to 1984, but the
data do not exhibit enough time variation within countries to enable reliable panel inference.) Relatedly, it
is well known that institutions are formed over the long run and are very persistent. The empirical strategy
in the paper is therefore consistent with the view that today's institutions are the result of a long period
of evolution and subject to in
uence by countries' comparative advantage and trade. Finally, the empirical
strategy in the paper exploits the variation in predicted comparative advantage as dictated by the countries'
exogenous geographical characteristics. It would not be feasible in a panel setting with country eects.
20relationship between INST and IIX is nonlinear: positive at lower values of IIX, then
turning negative for higher IIX. There appears to be no evidence of such nonlinearity,
suggesting that equation (11) is an accurate description of the actual country experiences.
4.1 Predicted Institutional Intensity of Exports
To carry out the analysis, the rst step is to construct the predicted institutional intensity
of exports, IIXc, for each country. The strategy in this paper is based on the approach
of Do and Levchenko (2007a), which expands the geography-based methodology of Frankel
and Romer (1999, henceforth FR). FR construct predicted trade as a share of GDP by
rst estimating a gravity regression on bilateral trade volumes between countries using
only exogenous geographical explanatory variables, such as bilateral distance, land areas,
and populations. From the estimated gravity equation, FR predict bilateral trade between
countries based solely on geographical variables. Then for each country they sum over trade
partners to obtain the predicted total trade to GDP, or \natural openness."
Do and Levchenko's (2007a) goal is to build a measure of export patterns, not aggregate
trade volumes, that is based on exogenous geographical variables. To do this, they extend
the FR methodology to industry level. Their procedure, described in Appendix A.2, gener-
ates predicted exports to GDP in each industry i and country c, b Xic. Armed with those, it is
straightforward to construct the predicted institutional intensity of exports. This measure
weights predicted exports b Xic by a sector-level index of institutional intensity, and sums




b Xic  Institutional Intensityi: (12)
Institutional intensity of each sector is sourced from Nunn (2007). It is dened as the
fraction of each industry's inputs not sold on organized exchanges or reference priced, and is
constructed based on US Input-Output Tables. The idea behind this measure is that inputs
sold in spot markets { those that can be obtained on organized exchanges, for instance
{ do not require contracts and thus good institutions. However, inputs that cannot be
bought this way require relationship-specic investments and thus rely on good contracting
institutions being in place. The higher the fraction of such inputs in an industry, the higher
is its \institutional intensity."
To summarize, the measure used in the analysis, IIXc, captures the institutional in-
tensity of exports of each country, as predicted exclusively by its exogenous geographic
characteristics. It be high in a country whose geographical characteristics imply that it is
21expected to export especially in sectors that rely on institutions. By contrast, countries
expected to export in industries that do not rely on institutions will exhibit lower values
of IIX. It is important to stress that IIX does not use any actual data on exports or
institutional quality of countries. It is instead constructed using only the exogenous geo-
graphical features of countries and their trading partners, and the same sector-level gravity
coecients applied to all countries. The empirical analysis below demonstrates that this
geographic predisposition to export in institutionally intensive sectors is strongly positively
correlated with actual institutional quality.
4.2 Data Description
The dependent variable, institutional quality, is proxied by the rule of law index from the
Governance Matters database of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). The index is
normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. It therefore ranges
from about -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best). Observations come at biyearly frequency, and we
take the average across 1996-2000. The model in this paper is about institutions that
govern economic relationships between private parties, such as enforcement of contracts and
property rights. This, the rule of law subcomponent of the Governance Matters database
is the most appropriate index to use.
The main right-hand side variable, IIXc, is constructed using the estimates of predicted
exports as a share of GDP for each industry i in country c, b Xic, sourced from Do and
Levchenko (2007a) and described in Appendix A.2. The construction of b Xic is carried
out at the 3-digit ISIC revision 2 level for manufacturing trade, yielding 28 sectors. The
estimates of b Xic are then combined with data on institutional intensity from Nunn (2007),
to produce our measures of IIXc. The list of sectors along with their institutional intensity
is presented in Appendix Table A1. The mean share of intermediate inputs not bought on
organized exchanges is 0.487, with a standard deviation across sectors of 0.206. According
to this measure, the least institutionally intensive sector is Petroleum Reneries, with only
6% of all inputs not bought on organized exchanges. The most institutionally dependent
sector is Transport Equipment, with 86% of inputs that are dierentiated.
The main controls in estimation include overall trade openness (imports plus exports as
a share of GDP) and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, both of which come from the Penn
World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002). We also use information on countries'
legal origin as dened by La Porta et al. (1998), extended to include the socialist legal
system. The nal sample is a cross-section of 141 countries and, unless otherwise indicated,
22the variables are averaged over 30 years, 1970-1999.
Appendix Table A2 presents the data on institutional quality, predicted institutional
intensity of exports, and overall trade openness for the countries in the sample, along with
basic summary statistics. Figure 6 plots institutional quality against the overall trade open-
ness. There is some positive association between institutions and overall trade openness,
but it is not strong, with the simple correlation of 0.16 and the Spearman correlation of 0.18.
Figure 7 plots institutions against the predicted institutional intensity of exports instead.
There appears to be a closer positive relationship between these two variables, with both
simple and Spearman correlation coecients of around 0.48. We now turn to a regression
analysis of the relationship between these two variables.
4.3 Results
Table 1 presents the baseline results of estimating equation (11). The rst column regresses
institutional quality on simple trade openness. There is a positive and signicant rela-
tionship, but it is not strong, with an R2 of 0.03. When instead in column 2 we regress
institutions on IIXc, the R2 is 0.23, and the variable of interest is signicant at the 1%
level, with a t-statistic of 6.3. Column 3 includes both the trade openness and the external
nance need of exports. The coecient on IIX is actually increased, while the coecient
on trade is of the \wrong" sign. Columns 4 and 5 attempt to control for other determinants
of institutions. We rst include the legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1998), and
then per capita income. The latter is meant to capture a country's overall level of develop-
ment. While in both of these specications the coecient on IIXc is somewhat smaller, it
nonetheless remains signicant at the 1% level. Finally, column 6 includes both the legal
origin dummies and per capita income on the right-hand side. The coecient on the vari-
able of interest is further reduced somewhat, but preserves its signicance at the 1% level.
The magnitude of the eect is sizeable but not implausibly large. The most conservative
coecient estimates imply that a one standard deviation change in IIXc is associated with
a change in institutional quality equivalent to 0.19 of its standard deviation.
Examining the denition of IIX, (12), it is clear that this variable will have high values
either because predicted overall trade b Xic is high across all sectors { \natural openness" {,
or because the country is predicted to export relatively more in the institutionally intensive
sectors. As evident from Figure 7, a lot of the variation in IIX is in fact driven by dierences
in overall \natural openness." Conceptually, the main index of IIX, which combines both
of these, is correct: what should matter is the combination of how strong is the disciplining
23eect of trade { the operall openness { and how easily the country can start exporting in the
advantageous sectors if it were to improve institutions. Clearly, in the absence of the former,
the latter matters little for the incentive to improve institutions. Nonetheless, we would
still like to demonstrate that the results are not driven exclusively by overall openness.
We do this in several ways. As a preliminary point, note that the overall openness is
already controlled for in all specications.9 Thus, any eect of IIX is already obtained
while netting out the impact of aggregate openness. Following Frankel and Romer (1999),
we control for land area and population, since those authors nd that natural openness
is highly correlated with country size. The results are reported in Column 7 of Table 1.
Clearly, controlling for area and population does not aect the coecient of interest, in
fact neither of these two variables is signicant. As a second exercise, we construct an
alternative index of IIX that is purged of the in
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ic is the predicted share of total exports in industry i in country c, constructed from





index is driven solely by the predicted dierences in sectoral export shares across sectors.
Column 8 of Table 1 uses it instead of the baseline measure. The results are robust to
purging the eects of \natural openness:" the coecient is signicant with a p-value of
5.6%, even with income, trade openness, and legal origins as controls.
To further establish that natural openness is not the predominant driving force behind
our results, Table 2 determines whether they are driven by outliers and entrepot countries.
Column 1 removes the outliers, dened as countries in the top 5 and bottom 5 percent of
the IIX distribution, and shows that the results are robust. Some of the countries with the
highest values of IIX are also entrepot countries, for which the values of trade openness
are high, but much of it is due to re-exports.10 Column 2 of Table 2 drops these countries,
and shows that the coecient estimates are actually larger and more signicant than in the
full sample. To summarize, the variety of exercises we perform all support the conclusion
that the variation in IIX, and therefore our results, are not driven exclusively by natural
openness.
We also check the robustness of the results in several other ways. Table 2 further
9Controlling for natural openness instead of actual openness leaves the results unchanged. The results
are available upon request.
10These economies are Bahrain, China-Hong Kong, Guyana, Malta, and Singapore. The 1970-99 average
trade as a share of GDP in these countries ranges from 156 to 340 percent.
24establishes that the results are not driven by particular subsamples. Column 3 drops the
OECD countries.11 The next column drops the sub-Saharan African countries. The results
are not sensitive to the exclusion of this region. The economies sometimes called \Asian
tigers" experienced some of the fastest growth of trade and institutional improvement over
the postwar period. Column 5 excludes the Asian tigers, to check that the results are not
driven by these particular countries.12 We next drop Latin America and the Caribbean,
and the Middle East and North Africa regions. The results are robust to excluding these
country groups. Finally, Column 7 drops countries that have more than 60% of their exports
in Mining and Quarrying, a sector that includes crude petroleum.13 The results are robust
to the exclusion of these countries.
Table 3 determines whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of additional ex-
planatory variables. All of the columns include the most stringent set of controls { trade
openness, per capita income, and legal origin dummies { but do not report their coecients
to conserve space. The rst column controls for the level of human capital by including
the average years of secondary schooling in the population from the Barro and Lee (2000)
database. The second column includes distance to the equator.14 Next, we control for
the fraction of the population speaking English as the rst language, sourced from Hall
and Jones (1999).15 The fourth column adds the Polity2 index, which is meant to capture
the strength of democratic institutions within a country. This index is sourced from the
Polity IV database.16 Column 5 includes an indicator of ethnic fractionalization, based
on Easterly and Levine (1997).17 Column 6 controls for inequality, by including the Gini
coecient of the income distribution sourced from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators. Finally, the last column controls for the proportion of the population that is
Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant, obtained from La Porta et al. (1999). It is clear that
the results are robust to the inclusion of all of these additional controls.
11OECD countries in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We thus exclude the newer members of the
OECD, such as Korea and Mexico.
12In our sample, we consider Asian tigers to be: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.
13There countries are Algeria, Angola, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait,
Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syrian Arab Republic.
14Alternatively, we included a tropics indicator, the average number of days with frost, and the mean
temperature. The results were robust.
15Alternatively, we also controlled for the share of the population speaking a European language, and the
indicator for \neo-Europe." The results were robust.
16We also used Polity IV's constraint on the executive variable, which is meant to capture the checks
placed on the power of the executive branch of government. The results were unchanged.
17We also controlled for the ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization using the variables developed
by Alesina et al. (2003). The results were unchanged.
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Recent literature has highlighted the role of the quality of institutions in various aspects
of countries' economic performance, including international trade. Given the emerging
consensus regarding their primary importance, the crucial question is what are the forces
that could drive institutional change. The main goal of this paper is to provide a simple
framework for modeling the eect of trade on the political economy of institutions. The
building blocks of the analysis are the model of institutional comparative advantage of
Levchenko (2007), and the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995).
What are the main conclusions from this exercise? The key consequence of bad in-
stitutions is the presence of rents that are captured by some parties inside the country.
Lobbying can give rise to imperfect institutions because the agents capturing those rents
have an incentive to lobby in order to retain them. Under trade, however, those very rents
disappear in the institutionally inferior country. In order to regain those rents, the country
must improve its institutions vis- a-vis its trading partner. In equilibrium, there is a \race to
the top": both countries adopt the best attainable level of institutional quality. This simple
framework captures the key idea that bad institutions are more costly in an open world.
However, it is also 
exible enough to investigate cases in which institutional improvement
does not occur. In particular, if one of the trading partners has a suciently strong tech-
nological comparative advantage in the institutionally intensive good, institutions will not
improve in either country. This extension is telling about the kinds of circumstances under
which trade brings institutional deterioration { namely, when trade increases, rather than
decreases rents.
Is it the case empirically that trade improves institutions? We argued that in order to
take this question to the data, it is necessary to rene the model's predictions as follows:
institutions will improve as a result of trade in countries that can expect to capture the
institutionally intensive sectors after trade opening. The empirical strategy relies on the
notion that a country's geographical characteristics will aect its expected export patterns.
Extending the approach of Frankel and Romer (1999), we constructed for each country its
predicted institutional intensity of exports, based solely on its geographical characteristics.
The estimates show that countries that are expected to specialize in institutionally intensive
sectors do in fact exhibit better institutions.
26A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows the treatment in Helpman and Krugman
(1985, pp. 13-14). The FPE set is dened as a partition of the world factor endowments
into countries such that every country can fully employ all of its factors using the integrated
equilibrium techniques of production. To prove that trade replicates the integrated equi-
librium factor prices, we observe that given the integrated equilibrium factor prices, every
rm employs the integrated equilibrium techniques of production. Thus, by denition of
the FPE set, under the integrated equilibrium factor prices, full employment prevails in
each country without movements of factors across countries. Thus, under trade in goods
but not factors, the world economy can produce the integrated equilibrium quantities of
all the goods. Since, under the integrated equilibrium factor prices, the aggregate world
income is also equal to the integrated equilibrium world income, and consumption shares
are also the same, there is goods market clearing. Thus, such a resource allocation and set
of factor and goods prices under trade are an equilibrium, which by construction replicates
the factor prices of the integrated equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2: Grossman and Helpman (2001, ch. 7) show that the equilib-
rium policy is jointly ecient, that is, it maximizes the joint welfare of the policymaker and
the interest group. The policymaker's outside option is not to deal with the interest group
at all. Thus, the interest group must provide the policymaker with a utility level at least




Thus, the interest group solves
max
2[0;1]
f[w() + xr()E()]H   g
subject to
S() + (1   )  G:
Because the interest group has no reason to give the policymaker a utility level higher than







Therefore, the interest group in eect chooses  to maximize a weighted sum of the its own
welfare gross of the contribution and the aggregate welfare:
max
2[0;1]
f[w() + xr()E()]H + S()g;
which is the same as equation (7). Note that in general, there are many possible contribution
schedules () which can be designed to achieve this outcome.
27It remains to show that for high enough values of , institutions are imperfect in the
autarky equilibrium. We can use the autarky equilibrium conditions (1) through (4) to








That is, H's welfare is strictly increasing in  when institutions are perfect ( = 0). This is
because while w() does decrease in , raising  allows H to earn rents in equilibrium, and
for low enough  the second eect dominates. Thus, the derivative of the rst term of the
maximand in the expression dening , (7), is positive. The derivative of the second term
is negative, but can be made arbitrarily small as  ! 0. Thus, there is a value of  2 [0;1),
such that the derivative of the maximand is positive in  at  = 0. This immediately leads
to the conclusion that for those parameter values,  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: The equilibrium responses [(c; c);c] at each possible
value of  c are constructed in a manner similar to the equilibrium in Proposition 4. In
particular, Grossman and Helpman (1995) show that the equilibrium response policy vector
in this game must maximize the joint welfare of the lobby group and the policy maker. The
equilibrium response value of c at each level of  c is then given by:
c( c) = arg max
c2[0;1]

w(c; c)Hc + cxr(c; c)Ec(c; c)H + cr(c; c)Kc	
;
(A.1)
for c = A;B. Once again, there are many contribution schedules (; c) that generate
this outcome.
We must show that the equilibrium is characterized by c = 0 for at least one country c.
From the expression for the equilibrium response institutions, it is clear that c( c) <  c
for all  c > 0. This is because when a country's institutions are inferior to its trading
partner's, every term in equation (A.1) will increase as a result of moving c below  c.
Thus, it must necessarily be the case that the equilibrium response to any level of the trade
partner's institutions is to set better institutions than the trade partner. This implies that
there is no equilibrium for which both A and B are strictly positive.
A.2 Predicted Industry-Level Exports
This Appendix describes the steps followed by Do and Levchenko (2007a) to extend the
FR approach to obtain the industry-level predicted exports. For each industry i, Do and
Levchenko (2007a) run the FR regression:
LogXicd =  + 1
i ldistcd + 2
i lpopc + 3
i lareac + 4
i lpopd + 5
i laread + (A.2)
6
i landlockedcd + 7
i bordercd + 8
i bordercd  ldistcd +
9
i bordercd  popc + 10
i bordercd  areac + 11
i bordercd  popd +
12
i bordercd  aread + 13
i bordercd  landlockedcd + "cd;
where LogXicd is the log of exports as a share of GDP in industry i, from country c to
country d. The right-hand side consists of the geographical variables. In particular, ldistcd
28is the log of distance between the two countries, dened as distance between the major
cities in the two countries, lpopc is the log of population of country c, lareac log of land
area, landlockedcd takes the value of 0, 1, or 2 depending on whether none, one, or both
of the trading countries are landlocked, and bordercd is the dummy variable for common
border. The right-hand side of the specication is identical to the one FR use.
Do and Levchenko (2007a) use trade 
ows from the World Trade Database described
in Feenstra et al. (2005). The database contains bilateral trade 
ows between more than
150 countries, accounting for 98% of world trade, for the period 1962-2000. Trade 
ows
are broken into sectors according to the 3-digit ISIC revision 2 classication, yielding 28
manufacturing sectors. To estimate the gravity equation, the bilateral trade 
ows Xicd are
averaged over the period 1970-1999. This allows to smooth out any short-run variation in
trade shares across sectors, and reduce the impact of zero observations.
Having estimated equation (A.2) for each industry, Do and Levchenko (2007a) then
obtain the predicted logarithm of industry i exports to GDP from country c to each of
its trading partners indexed by d, \ LogXicd. In order to construct the predicted overall
industry i exports as a share of GDP from country c, they take the exponential of the
predicted bilateral log of trade, and sum over the trading partner countries d = 1;:::;C,







That is, predicted total trade as a share of GDP for each industry and country is the sum
of the predicted bilateral trade to GDP over all trading partners. This exercise extends and
modies the FR methodology in two respects. First, and most importantly, it constructs
the FR predicted trade measures by industry. And second, rather than looking at total
trade, it looks solely at exports.
Do and Levchenko (2007a) discuss and justify this strategy at length. As mentioned
above, the objective is to predict trade patterns, not trade volumes. How can this procedure
yield dierent predictions for b Xic across sectors if all of the geographical characteristics on
the right-hand side of equation (A.2) do not vary by sector? Note that the procedure
estimates an individual gravity equation for each sector. Thus, crucially for this strategy, if
the vector of estimated gravity coecients i diers across sectors, so will the predicted total
exports b Xic across sectors i within the same country. Indeed, Do and Levchenko (2007a)
show that the variation in these coecients across sectors is indeed substantial, generating
variation in predicted trade patterns across countries.
There is another potentially important issue, namely the zero trade observations. In Do
and Levchenko's gravity sample, only about two-thirds of the possible exporter-importer
pairs record positive exports, in any sector. At the level of individual industry, on average
only a third of possible country-pairs have strictly positive exports, in spite of the coarse
level of aggregation (28 sectors).18 Do and Levchenko's (2007a) procedure deals with zero
observations in two ways. First, following the large majority of gravity studies, they take
logs of trade values, and thus their baseline gravity estimation procedure ignores zeros.
18These two calculations make the common assumption that missing trade observations represent zeros
(see Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2007).
29However, instead of predicting in-sample, they use the estimated gravity model to predict
out-of-sample. Thus, for those observations that are zero or missing and are not used in the
actual estimation, they still predict trade.19 In the second approach, they instead estimate
the gravity regression in levels using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator
suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The advantage of this procedure is that it
actually includes zero observations in the estimation, and can predict both zero and non-
zero trade values in-sample from the same estimated equation. Its disadvantage is that
it assumes a particular likelihood function, and is not (yet) a standard way of estimating
gravity equations found in the literature. It turns out that the two are quite close to
each other, an indication that the zeros problem is not an important one for this empirical
strategy. This paper only reports the results of implementing the rst approach. The results
of using the second one are available upon request.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Best Responses and Equilibrium Institutions, Country A has a 
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Notes: This figure presents the scatter plot of the quality of institutions, proxied by the Rule of Law index from the 
Governance Matters database of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), against the log of exports plus imports as 
a share of GDP from the Penn World Tables.  
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Notes: This figure presents the scatter plot of the quality of institutions, proxied by the Rule of Law index from the 
Governance Matters database of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), against the predicted institutional 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Appendix Table A1: The Institutional Intensity Measure
ISIC Industry Name Institutional Intensity




322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.745
323 Leather products 0.571
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.650
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.516
332 Furniture, except metal 0.568
341 Paper and products 0.348
342 Printing and publishing 0.713
351 Industrial chemicals 0.240
352 Other chemicals 0.490
353 Petroleum refineries 0.058
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.395
355 Rubber products 0.407
356 Plastic products 0.408
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.329
362 Glass and products 0.557
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.377
371 Iron and steel 0.242
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.160
381 Fabricated metal products 0.435
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.764
383 Machinery, electric 0.740
384 Transport equipment 0.859
385 Professional & scientific equipment 0.785
390 Other manufactured products 0.547
Mean 0.487
Standard Deviation 0.206
Notes: Institutional Intensity is the share of intermediate inputs that cannot be 
bought on organized exchanges and is not reference-priced. Source: Nunn 
(2007).
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